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The Obama administration’s decision not to place missile defense systems in Poland and 
the Czech Republic provides an interesting view into the work in progress that is the 
Obama administration’s foreign policy regarding Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union.  It is also perhaps the first indication that administration’s famous “reset” button 
with Russia is more than just talk. 
The missile defense system as initially proposed was presented by the Bush 
administration as a way to help protect American allies from any threat from Iran’s 
developing nuclear weapons program.  Moscow, however, viewed the proposed 
deployment as further efforts by the U.S. to humiliate and surround Russia.  Inevitably, 
missile defense became part of the range of disagreements, which also include Georgia 
and the South Caucasus, the Manas Air Force Base and, probably most importantly, 
NATO expansion, between the two countries. 
Obama’s decision to stop pursuing this is being described by critics as surrendering to 
Russia and a sign of the American president’s weakness.  When viewed through the 
narrow lens of competition and machismo, this is not an unreasonable conclusion, but 
when the lens is expanded to include the actual interests of the U.S. and its allies, things 
look a little different. 
The decision on missile defense, while obviously well received in Moscow, does not 
mean the U.S. has surrendered anything, nor given in to Russian pressure.  The likely 
capabilities of Iran’s weapons program, unnecessarily stressing an already tense 
relationship with Russia while gaining little, and the often overlooked unpopularity of the 
program in Poland and particularly the Czech Republic are all solid, rational reasons for 
abandoning this program.  The reasons for supporting the program have gradually 
become less clear.  In many respects, the most compelling reason for the missile defense 
plan was that changing course would be seen as giving in to Russia. 
While standing up to Russia is often important and necessary, doing it simply for its own 
sake is not.  Obama has made it clear that there are some issues important to Russia on 
which his administration will not be flexible.  Obama’s support for Georgia and refusal to 
even consider recognition for Abkhazia and South Ossetia are examples of the new 
administration pursuing the right policy in the region in spite of Russian disapproval. 
Obama’s support for Georgia has been a particular problem for the Kremlin who may 
have misguidedly thought the new American president would be less supportive of that 
country.  The lack of ambiguity in the U.S. position was made evident shortly after the 
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Obama-Medvedev summit in Moscow when Vice-President Biden travelled to Tbilisi 
specifically to make the U.S. commitment to Georgia, which had been reiterated in 
Moscow, clear.  This trip was so successful in this regard that Georgia’s mercurial 
president Mikheil Saakashvili went so far as to state that Biden’s trip had “foiled” 
Russia’s plans to attack Georgia again.  Just to make the point more clear, Biden gave a 
wide ranging interview to the Wall Street Journal on the way back from Tbilisi that 
spelled out some of the key and highly critical assumptions underpinning Obama’s 
Russia policy. 
In many respects, Obama’s decision on missile defense is part of a broader trend of a 
foreign policy that is less about positioning, or bluster and more about outcomes than that 
of his predecessor.  Refusing to pick a fight with Moscow for its own sake is not a sign of 
weakness.  It is a sign that U.S. foreign policy is moving back to being driven by rational 
policy considerations, rather than being consumed by ideological narratives.  American 
politicians have learnt that Barack Obama should not be underestimated.  It does not 
seem that the Kremlin has figured this out yet, but it would be a mistake for those in the 
Kremlin, or anywhere else, to view this reasonable and practical decision by the U.S. that 
happens to please Moscow as a sign of weakness or surrender. 
